We study a model in which cooperation and defection coexist in a dynamical steady state. In our model, subpopulations of cooperators and defectors inhabit sites on a lattice. The interactions among the individuals at a site, in the form of a prisoner's dilemma (PD) game, determine their "tnesses. The chosen PD payo! allows cooperators, but not defectors, to maintain a homogeneous population. Individuals mutate between types and migrate to neighboring sites with low probabilities. We consider both density-dependent and densityindependent versions of the model. The persistence of cooperation in this model can be explained in terms of the life cycle of a population at a site. This life cycle starts when one cooperator establishes a population. Then defectors invade and eventually take over, resulting "nally in the death of the population. During this life cycle, single cooperators migrate to empty neighboring sites to found new cooperator populations. The system can reach a steady state where cooperation prevails if the global &&birth'' rate of populations is equal to their global &&death'' rate. The dynamic persistence of cooperation ranges over a large section of the model's parameter space. We compare these dynamics to those from other models for the persistence of altruism and to predator}prey models.
Introduction
Explaining the evolution and persistence of cooperation is a central problem in evolutionary biology and the social sciences (Axelrod, 1984) . A cooperating individual has higher "tness within a group of cooperators than it has in isolation. Nevertheless, cooperative behavior often entails a "tness cost. Consequently, a defecting individual*one that enjoys the cooperation of others but abstains from cooperative behavior*will have an immediate selective advantage over cooperators. This advantage renders a population of cooperators susceptible to invasion and take-over by defecting individuals. Therefore, the persistence and evolution of cooperation seems to face an intrinsic instability.
The interaction between cooperators and defectors is often formalized in terms of the game known as the prisoners' dilemma (PD) (Weibull, 1995) . The PD payo! matrix appears in Table 1 . This is a symmetric game between two players, where each player has two possible strategies: defect or cooperate. The game is set up such that, for any strategy of the opponent, a defector has a greater payo! than a cooperator, but if both players cooperate they have a greater payo! than if both defect. In the framework of evolutionary game theory (Weibull, 1995) this game can be used in order to study the evolution and 
persistence of cooperation. One can assume that individuals in a population of cooperators and defectors interact randomly in pairs, and that the "tness of an individual is determined by the payo!s it receives in its interactions. The population dynamics under these assumptions have two principal characteristics:
1. A population consisting only of cooperators grows faster than a population consisting only of defectors (this follows from the relation ' in the payo! matrix). 2. In any population with both types, a defector has a higher "tness than a cooperator (this follows from the relations ' and ' ).
How can cooperation evolve and persist if defection is always the locally favored strategy? We mention three main categories of answers to this question, though the distinction between them is not always sharp. The "rst category is the individual centered approach, where cooperation persists because it eventually confers a "tness advantage at the level of the individual. Models incorporating reciprocity (Axelrod, 1984) , partnership (Cooper & Wallace, 1998) , or the handicap principle (Roberts, 1998) fall into this class. The second category is kin selection (Hamilton, 1964) . This includes models of kin recognition (Axelrod, 1984) , models where kin interaction results from individual behavior in a spatial context, and more generally models of statistical kinship (Eshel & Cavalli-Sforza, 1982) . The third category consists of structured population dynamic models. It includes among others, the hay stack model (Maynard-Smith, 1964; Wilson, 1987) , models of the founder e!ect (Cohen & Eshel, 1976) , and models of the neighbor e!ect (Eshel, 1971) . Nowak & May (1992) introduced a family of models which combines aspects of all three categories mentioned above, and was studied intensively during the last decade. In these models (Nakamaru & Iwasa, 1997 Ferriere & Michod, 1995; Oliphant, 1999) , individuals occupy lattice sites and play the iterated or non-iterated PD game with their neighbors on the lattice. The model we present here falls into the third category. The dynamics which maintain cooperation in our model, which we describe below, distinguish it from earlier models in this category.
In a review about group selection (MaynardSmith, 1976) , Maynard Smith mentions a predator}prey model (Maynard-Smith, 1974) and claims that it is analogous to a model for the persistence of altruism (or cooperation in our terminology). In that model, isolated patches may be in one of the following three states: E*empty, containing neither prey nor predator, H*containing prey only, and M*containing both prey and predator. An empty patch may be colonized by prey that migrate from a di!erent patch, thus changing its state from E to H. A patch in state H may be colonized by migrating predators, changing its state from H to M. In a patch in state M, the predators eventually exhaust the prey and die, thus changing the state of the system from M to E. Having studied such systems with computer simulations, Maynard Smith concludes that: && 2 such models can rather easily give persistent coexistence of predator and prey; that is, persistence does not require a particularly careful choice of parameters''. In such a state of persistence, each patch goes through a series of transitions EPHP MPEP2 inde"nitely. In this paper, we show that the underlying dynamics of interaction between cooperators and defectors can lead to the persistence of cooperation in a dynamic mode similar to that described by Maynard Smith.
In the model presented in Section 2, subpopulations of cooperators and defectors cohabit 466 sites on a lattice. The random interaction among the individuals at a site determine their "tness, based on PD payo!s. The standard PD condition that 2 ' # , meaning that a group of cooperators has a higher average "tness than any other group, does not a!ect the dynamics, and therefore we do not impose it. Individuals mutate between types and migrate to a neighboring site with low probabilities. The "tness function at a site may also depend on the population density at the site. It is important to stress that in this model the population size at a site is "nite and varies over time. The population at a given site may die out, thereby leaving the site empty until it is occupied again by a migrating individual.
We seek the conditions for the persistence of cooperation when subpopulations consisting solely of defectors are doomed to face extinction, while subpopulations consisting solely of cooperators are capable of persisting. In terms of the PD payo!s, this qualitative asymmetry occurs when '1' . We show that under this assumption, the population dynamics at a site takes the form of a life cycle. The life cycle begins when a cooperator migrates into an empty site and founds a cooperator population. This population is later invaded by a defector, which is either a mutant or a migrant. Defectors then take over, after which the population dies and the life cycle ends. In Section 3, we study the life cycles that emerge in both the density-dependent and densityindependent models. The life cycles are analysed in terms of two variables that are later used to characterize the conditions for the dynamic persistence of cooperation in the system: R2the ratio of the total number of cooperators to the total number of defectors over the duration of a life cycle; and M2the total number of individuals that migrate out of a site over the duration of a life cycle.
Over a large range of the parameter values, cooperation persists in a steady state where on average one cooperator migrates to an empty neighboring site during a single life cycle, thus initiating a new cycle before the original cycle ends. In such a steady state the global &&birth'' rate of cooperating populations balances their &&death'' rate due to defector take-over. In Section 4, we use computer simulations to study the regions of dynamical persistence in terms of the life cycle variables R and M. We also construct a simpli"ed model for the density-dependent model which is similar to the predator}prey model described above. Using this simpli"ed model, we construct a mean-"eld approximation in which we analytically derive the conditions for dynamical persistence, and a higher-order approximation incorporating spatial correlations. These approximations explain the shape of the boundary that separates the regions in which cooperation persists from the regions in which it does not in the R and M space. For the densityindependent model, we show that increasing the payo! for the interaction between cooperators, , can increase the number of cooperators in the system, the number of sites they occupy, and their number relative to defectors. Moreover, increasing this payo! beyond a critical value results in the extinction of cooperation. These results are explained both intuitively and on the basis of analytical derivations.
The Model
We introduce an evolutionary model of "nite subpopulations inhabiting sites on an in"nite two-dimensional rectangular lattice. Each individual in a subpopulation is either a cooperator or a defector, where these behaviors are genetically determined (variables referring to these will be marked with subscript c for cooperators and d for defectors). The dynamics proceed from selection with absolute "tnesses, mutation and di!usion.
The "tness of an individual stems from its interactions with other individuals at the same site on the lattice, according to the PD payo! matrix in Table 1 . We assume a PD-type interaction, with the asymmetry described in the introduction. The payo!s must therefore satisfy the following conditions:
(henceforth we omit the subscripts on these parameters). Consider a site with n A cooperators and n B defectors interacting at random. The absolute "tness functions of cooperators and defectors at time t, which measure the average growth in THE DYNAMIC PERSISTENCE OF COOPERATION -Note that the "tness functions include the interaction of an individual with itself. Not including an individual in the calculation of its "tness requires a separate de"nition of the "tness of an individual in isolation, but does not change qualitatively any of the results in this paper. a time step , are-
where n"n A #n B is the total population at the site, and g(n) is a function re#ecting the density dependence. We will assume that g(n))1, but that g(n A )'1 for a population size smaller than the carrying capacity n*'0 (the densityindependent model corresponds to g(n)"1).
These "tness functions are characterized by two principal features:
1. A homogeneous cooperator population grows faster than a homogeneous defector population. Moreover, a homogeneous cooperator population is capable of maintaining itself while a homogeneous defector population is not. These properties follow from the relations f B (0, n B )" g(n B )(1 for any n B O0, and f A (n A , 0)" g(n A )'1 for n A below the carrying capacity n*. 2. A defector has a higher "tness than a cooperator in any population structure, since
The population growth at a site is described by a stochastic process, resulting in the absolute "tness functions of eqns (2 and 3). The following analytic results depend only on the average growth rates, and not on the speci"c stochastic process that realizes them. In our simulation, we assume that an individual with "tness f"n#x, where n is a nonnegative integer and 0(x(1, is represented in the next time step by n#1 individuals with probability x, and by n individuals with probability 1!x.
Mutation and migration are incorporated in each time step as follows:
1. The subpopulations at all sites grow stochastically according to the "tness functions. 2. Each individual may mutate to become the other type with probability ;1. 3. Each individual may migrate to one of its neighboring sites with probability D;1. We assume the von-Neumann neighborhood of four neighbors on a rectangular lattice.
The expected values for n A (t# ) and n B (t# ) at a site given n A (t) and n B (t) are then
where superscript n.n. denotes the values at nearest-neighboring sites. We take ;1 where 1 denotes the duration of an average generation. This implies that the "tness coe$cients , , , and the corresponding "tness functions are close to 1. Furthermore, it means that the stochastic process approaches a process continuous in time. When ;1, ;1 and D;1, however, our scheme is equivalent to any other reasonable scheme that incorporates selection, mutation and di!usion, and to other reasonable schemes for the stochastic selection. 
Local Behavior=The Life Cycle
We begin the analysis by considering the local behavior at one site. This behavior can be described in terms of a typical life cycle. A life cycle for the density-independent model (d.i.) is described in Fig. 1 . It begins when one cooperator migrates to an empty site. The population of cooperators then begins to grow. The growth rate depends on f A (n A , 0)" g(n A ). At some time denoted by t D , the "rst defector appears from mutation or migration and defectors begin to take over. At some stage when defectors dominate the population, the "tness of cooperators drops below 1 and their number starts decreasing. Some time afterwards, as the frequency of cooperators decreases the "tness of defectors approaches and in the process becomes less than 1. The life cycle ends at time t C when the last defector dies, some time after the last cooperator disappeared.
Every life cycle ends with the death of the whole population at a site after a "nite time. Therefore, for cooperation to persist, new life cycles have to be founded at a rate that balances their termination. The conditions for the existence of such a steady state are studied in Section 4. These conditions will be stated in terms of parameters characterizing the life cycle. A natural choice of parameters relevant for the global dynamics is the number of cooperators and defectors that migrate out of a site during a life cycle; we denote them as M A and M B . In order to derive these parameters from a description of the life cycle, we de"ne
M A and M B are then given by
Two equivalent parameters which turn out to be useful are
Here M corresponds to the total number of units migrating from a site during a life cycle and R corresponds to the ratio of cooperators to defectors in the life cycle. The dependence of the global dynamics and in particular of the persistence of cooperation on R and M, will be studied in Section 4. In this section, we study the population dynamics at a site, focusing on the factors determining R and M. 
The only signi"cant e!ect (i.e. not O[ , D]) that mutation and migration have on the life cycle is in determining t D . Therefore, we conclude that R"R( , , , ) #O[ , D] . Result 1 provides an explicit expression for R( , , , ).
Result 1. In the density-independent model the ratio R of the average number of migrating cooperators to the average number of migrating defectors in a life cycle is
We prove this in Appendix A.
A careful look at eqn (12) reveals that reducing (but maintaining the condition '1) while leaving every other parameter "xed can yield a larger ratio of cooperators to defectors, since
It seems reasonable and it will be shown later, that the larger R is, the more likely it is that cooperation could persist in the system. This hints at the possibility that in certain parameter regions of the d.i. model, decreasing while leaving all the other parameters "xed will transform the global behavior from a state where cooperation cannot persist to a state where it can. Such behavior is seen in simulation results in Figs 3, 4, 5, 9, in Section 4. Thus, in this model lower cooperator "tness may induce higher survivability! This e!ect would not have been anticipated from an individual centered perspective. On the other hand, when the life cycle is considered, there is a simple explanation for this e!ect: The integral number of defectors during the life cycle S " strongly depends on the number of cooperators at the time the "rst defector invades n A (t D ). Therefore, cooperators can increase their fraction by maximizing their integral S A while keeping n A (t D ) "xed. This explains why R increases when is smaller. Roughly speaking, the moral is that when surrounded by defectors, keeping a low pro"le might be a good idea.
THE DENSITY-DEPENDENT MODEL
We consider an example of a d.d. model with
In this model, the population size is bounded by n K?V . The life cycle for this model is described in , where all the other parameters are identical to those in the simulation in Fig. 3 . In this case, the system reaches the trivial*all empty steady state. This is a case where taking higher cooperator "tness results in the extinction of cooperation. This e!ect is discussed further in Section 4.3.
FIG. 5. The population at a speci"c site as a function of time, for the same simulation presented in Fig. 3 . The life cycles vary in size due to the stochasticity in the t D 's. This stochasticity is caused by variations in the environment and in mutation. However, the shape of the di!erent life cycles is similar, in correspondence with the scaling properties discussed in Section 3.1: (**) defector population; ( ) cooperator population. 
ensures that R is bounded from below by R*, where SI B is E(S B ) for the density-independent model with the same parameters , , , , and initial conditions nJ
This means that for any such model and parameters , , , and , any desired ratio R may be attained by taking small enough and D.
Global Behavior
In the systems we studied, there are two types of steady states for the global behavior: the trivial steady state where all sites are empty, and nontrivial steady states in which cooperation persists globally. The behavior of two simulations of systems with d.i. dynamics is presented in Figs 3 and 4. In the "rst simulation, we start with a few sites inhabited by one cooperator each, and cooperation spreads to establish a non-trivial steady state. This steady state is dynamic in nature; cooperation persists even though each cooperator population eventually dies out. This can be seen in Fig. 5 , where the population size at one site is described as a function of time. In the system described in Fig. 4 , the population also starts with a few sites inhabited by one cooperator, but in this case, populations do not seed new ones at a rate that balances their rate of destruction by defectors from within and without. All the subpopulations in this system eventually die out, leaving it in the steady state where all the sites are empty.
A well-de"ned non-trivial steady state requires an in"nite lattice. Yet our simulations occur on a "nite lattice. We argue that when it exists, the non-trivial steady state is the only steady state, and thus it will be attained in any reasonable choice of initial conditions. We do not prove this claim on our system. We show, however, that the "xed point analog to the non-trivial steady state in the mean-"eld approximation to the d.d. dynamics is the only stable "xed point in the system when it exists. Due to the stochasticity, any "nite realization of the model on a "nite lattice will always end up in the state where all the sites are empty. Nevertheless, the non-trivial steady state has a pronounced signature in the "nite realizations of the model. In the parameter ranges corresponding to the non-trivial steady state, the duration in which cooperation persists in the "nite system grows very fast with the size of the lattice. In Appendix D, we describe the criteria we use to determine when the "nite simulations reach a state corresponding to the steady state. In the parameter ranges where these criteria hold, the system never reaches the empty state, in thousands of simulations lasting hundreds of thousands of generations each. Consequently, we can study the regions in which cooperation persists using simulations on "nite THE DYNAMIC PERSISTENCE OF COOPERATION FIG. 6 . A life cycle in the simpli"ed model: population as a function time. Notice the similarity to the densitydependent life cycle (Fig. 2) . systems, and assume that large systems have dynamical behavior that is independent of initial conditions.
In these models, the global dynamics derive from an interplay between the local dynamics at a site and the interaction of the subpopulations in this site with its environment. The local dynamics at a site were described in the previous section. They are a!ected by its environment through the in#ow of cooperators and defectors. When a site is empty, this in#ow determines when it will become inhabited by a cooperator; and when a site is inhabited by cooperators with no defectors, this in#ow will determine how long it will take for it to be invaded by a defector*t D . The environment, on the other hand, is generated by the local dynamics at sites. Essentially, the more intricate are the population dynamics at a site, the more complex is the analysis of the global dynamics. In the d.d. models, the rough temporal structure of the life cycle is rather simple, and it is possible to approximate its global behavior by dividing the life cycle into three main stages: empty, cooperation and defection, where in each the population could be considered as being in one state. In each of these states, the internal dynamics at each site and its interactions with its environment can be described as a Markov process switching between states. Note that this simpli"ed model is very similar to Maynard Smith's (MaynardSmith, 1974) predator}prey model described in the introduction. For a simpli"ed model of this nature we can obtain an analytical approximation of the conditions for the existence of a non-trivial steady state. We brie#y outline a simpli"ed model and its analysis in Sections 4.1, 4.2 and in Appendix C. The life cycle for the d.i. model described in Figs 1 and 5 consists of many di!erent states, since each population structure*n A , n B , a!ects the evolution at the site and the sites e!ect on its environment di!erently. Each of these states is characterized by a di!erent out#ow of cooperators and defectors. This makes the global analysis of these models much more complicated. For this reason, we restrict the study of their global behavior to simulations. The results from the analysis and simulations of the simpli"ed d.d. model and from the simulations of the d.i. model are presented in Section 4.3.
A SIMPLIFIED DENSITY-DEPENDENT MODEL
The life cycle at a site for the simpli"ed d.d. model is described in Fig. 6 . In this model, for which the life cycle is a simpli"cation of the d.d. life cycle shown in Fig. 2 , when a cooperator enters an empty site it immediately establishes a population of n A cooperators. After some time, the population is invaded by a defector that is either a mutant from within or a migrant from without. Once a defector invades, it instantaneously takes over and establishes a constant population of n B defectors. This population has a probability P B per unit time to die and leave the site empty. Di!usion and mutation are stochastic as in the non-simpli"ed models.
The simpli"ed model can be seen as an interacting particle system, where a site (i, j) (which corresponds to the particle) can be in one of the three states:
The dynamics of this system can be described as a Markov process, written here in terms of the transition probabilities for a site (i, j) during a time step : ? Note, that both this and the &&second-order'' mean-"eld approximations, can be treated as models for the persistence of cooperation by their own right.
Here, the number of (i, j)'s nearest neighbors in state c is denoted as IGH A , and the number of nearest neighbors in state d is denoted as IGH B . In writing these dynamics it was assumed that the time step ;1, so that e!ects that are second order in and D can be ignored. Equation (14) describes how a site changes its state from e to c, by way of a nearest-neighbor interaction corresponding to di!usion. Equation (15) describes how a site changes its state from c to d, either by nearestneighbor interaction corresponding to di!usion, or spontaneously in a way which corresponds to mutation. Finally, eqn (16) describes how a site changes its state from d to e, spontaneously, in a way that corresponds to the death of the defector population.
Equations (14)}(18) have four parameters: Dn A , Dn B , n A and P B . As D, , and P B are all homogeneous to the "rst order in the time-scale , so are the right-hand sides (r.h.s.) in eqns (14)}(18). This means that one of the four parameters, such as P B , could be taken to determine the time-scale. The other three could be taken to be independent of the time-scale, for example, Dn B /P B , D/ and n A /n B (which are independent and homogeneous with degree 0 in ).
This model captures the qualitative features of the local behavior of the explicit d.d. models of Section 2. The establishment of cooperation, the defector take-over and the populations' extinction which derive from the population dynamics at a site in the explicit d.d. models are assumed in the simpli"ed model. The interactions between a site and its environment, however, are of the same form in both simpli"ed and general d.d. models. The environment a!ects when the empty site becomes inhabited and when the defector take-over occurs. On the other hand, a site a!ects its environment by di!using out cooperators and defectors.
A MEAN-FIELD APPROXIMATION TO THE SIMPLIFIED DENSITY-DEPENDENT MODEL
We would like to "nd the region in the model's parameter space in which a non-trivial steady state exists. One way to do this, is to solve the model analytically. A solution is a stationary probability distribution on the space of all possible lattice con"gurations P(+S GH , GHZ8 ) as a function of the model's parameters. Using a mean-"eld approximation one can "nd the best solution within a restricted class of distributions. Roughly speaking, as the class of distributions becomes larger the approximations become better. In this paper, we will not evaluate the accuracy of the approximations other than by comparing their predictions with simulations. A systematic evaluation of these approximations, as well as a more accurate analysis using Renormalization Groups, has been done for other particle systems (Goldenfeld, 1992; Baxter, 1982) .
The "rst-order mean-"eld approximation is restricted to probability distributions of the form
This means that the probability of "nding the system in a certain con"guration can be decomposed into a product of the probabilities of "nding each site in its state. One further assumes that the probabilities of "nding a site in state c, d or e are uniform across the lattice. Under these assumptions the system's description reduces to the probabilities of "nding any site in each one of the possible states.? Denoting these probabilities which are independent of the site by p C , p A , and p B , the system's dynamics reduces to
where A CA , A AB and A BC denote the transition probabilities, which can be derived from eqns (14):
Here we set I B "4p B (t) and I A "4p A (t). The "xed point and stability analysis for this system is straightforward. A non-trivial "xed point (one where p C O1) exists if
When this condition holds, the system has two meaningful "xed points, with one being trivial (p C "1) and the other not. In this case, only the non-trivial "xed point is stable, and thus the persistence of cooperation is obtained for any initial condition in which p A (0)O0. For this nontrivial "xed point, expressions for R, M or any other dynamic parameter of the system, as func-
and P B can be derived. Deriving condition 22 from general considerations will help in understanding the scope of the "rst-order approximation. For a non-trivial steady state to be maintained, every life cycle has on average to establish exactly one new life cycle. This requirement takes the form:
where A C denotes the density of empty sites near a site in state c. This density equals the probability that a cooperator leaving a site will establish a new life cycle. Condition (22) could be derived from eqn (23) by putting trivial bounds on A C and S A :
The bound on A C is realized only when all the neighboring sites are empty. The bound on t D is also realized when all the neighboring sites are empty, i.e. when the "rst defector is always a mutant. These two bounds imply that condition (22) is equivalent to the requirement that at least one cooperator di!uses out in a life cycle at a site surrounded by empty neighbors. As the number of cooperators in a life cycle at an isolated site depends only on , the number of cooperators di!using from it depends only on and D.
Condition (22) indicates that the "rst-order mean-"eld approximation cannot incorporate the harmful e!ects of migration, an important feature of the model. In the "rst-order mean-"eld approximation, the density A C can approach 1 enabling cooperators to survive as long as on average one cooperator migrates during a life cycle. This means that in this approximation defector migration does not really determine whether cooperation prevails or not, because the density of inhabited sites can always be so low that no defector ever invades it. In the spatial model the density A C can never reach 1, because near a population of cooperators there is always a "nite probability of having the population from which the founding cooperator migrated. The neighboring population, in this case, will be in either state c or d during some part of the life cycle of its daughter subpopulation. This discrepancy between the spatial model and the "rstorder mean-"eld approximation, is demonstrated in Figs 3 and 4. The second picture in Fig. 4 (25 generations) indicates that a life cycle at a site surrounded by empty sites produced more than one di!using cooperator. Yet cooperation does not prevail due to the e!ects of extensive defector migration into sites inhabited by cooperators. An approximation incorporating such e!ects would have to describe the correlations between the states of nearest neighbors. Such an approximation is outlined in Appendix C. Results presented in the next section will hint at the possibility that as the phase transition between persistence and non-persistence of cooperation is approached the correlation length in the system goes to in"nity. This would imply that near the parameters at which the transition happens, the reliability of such mean-"eld approximations is questionable. a non-trivial steady state is maintained, is characterized by a stationary probability distribution on all possible lattice con"gurations. We would like to present these (6/4)-dimensional phase spaces in a comprehensible way, that permits comparison with the global behavior of models which derive from di!erent local parameters. In doing so, we will necessarily lose some information, information that can be further explored using di!erent representations. To the extent that the "ne temporal and spatial structure of a steady state in these models can be ignored, the basic variables characterizing the global dynamics would be M2the average number of migrants during a life cycle, and R2the cooperator to defector ratio among these migrants. Phase spaces in the R}M coordinates, which were derived from analytical approximations to the simpli"ed d. Figs 7 and 8 correspond to the boundaries in R}M space below which a non-trivial steady state does not exist according to the "rst and second-order approximations. We will refer to such a boundary as a phase boundary. The thick lines in Figs 7 and 8 represent the phase boundaries derived from simulations. They were derived as described in Appendix D. In the simpli-
one of the basic parameters of the model, while DS
A derives from the dynamics (see Sections 3.2 and 4.1). As M"DS B #DS A and R"DS A /DS B , one component of R and M is a parameter whereas the other is an outcome of the dynamics depending on the other parameters. In the d.i. model the situation is similar (3.1), R is a function of , , and , and thus can be considered to be a parameter, whereas M derives from the dynamics which depends on the other parameters.
The shape of the phase boundaries from the analysis and simulations can be roughly understood from the heuristic derivation in the previous section, eqn (23) , which predicts that the phase boundary takes the form:
where C is some constant. The di!erences in the shape and position of the phase boundaries re#ect the e!ects of the "ne spatio-temporal dynamic structure. As we discussed at the end of the previous section, one can state roughly that the e!ect of spatial correlations, i.e. spatiotemporal structure, is to increase the damage that defectors in#ict*thus imposing stronger restrictions on the region in the R}M space where a non-trivial steady state can be maintained. This causes the phase boundaries resulting from the simulations to be above those resulting from the second-order approximation; as well as for second-order phase boundary to be above the "rst order. A systematic study of the factors e!ecting the phase boundaries requires the study of higher-order correlations.
RESULTS II: HOW LOWER INDIVIDUAL FITNESS INDUCES HIGHER SURVIVABILITY
The drawback of using R}M phase spaces to study a speci"c model is a loss of information about the relation between the system's behavior and its basic parameters. In the d.i. model the persistence of cooperation depends on the parameter *the "tness associated with interactions between cooperators. In Section 3.1 we explain why a reduction in leads to a larger cooperator to defector ratio R, and derive the functional dependence of R on . As increases and R decreases, we expect that the disturbance from defectors will grow to a point where cooperation cannot be maintained. This e!ect is illustrated in Figs 3 and 4. Across two systems we took all the parameters other than to be equal. The system with the smaller reached a non-trivial steady state in which cooperation persisted, whereas the system with the larger reached the trivial steady state without cooperation.
Figs 9(a)}(c) illustrate the behavior of several dynamic variables as a function of , while all the other parameters are "xed. When increases, the number of migrating defectors also increases while the number of migrating cooperators remains approximately constant [ Fig. 9(a) ]. Thus, both R [ Fig. 9(b) ], and the density of occupied sites [ Fig. 9(c) ] decrease. Hence, a decrease in the individual "tness of cooperators leads to increases in: the total number of cooperators in the system, the density of sites they occupy, and their numbers relative to defectors. Note that the measured R [ Fig. 9(b) ] is very close to the analytically derived value. This supports the scaling argument described in Section 3.1 and demonstrated in Fig. 5 .
Around "1.0175, the rate of destruction by migrating defectors reaches a level that precludes the maintenance of a non-trivial steady state, like the example described in Fig. 4 . Increasing the individual "tness of cooperators therefore leads to a condition in which cooperation can no longer persist. Note that near the phase boundary the density of occupied sites drops [ Fig. 9(c) ]. This suggests that the correlation distance in the system grows at this vicinity. As mentioned in the previous section, this casts doubts on the reliability of the mean-"eld approximations near the phase boundary.
Discussion
We have demonstrated that cooperation may persist in a dynamic mode where populations of 476 A Note that we have used M for a di!erent meaning. # Maynard-Smith considers systems where defectors can either persist in coexistence with cooperators or go extinct. In our system these options apply to cooperators rather than to defectors. Defectors and cooperators are not equivalent in our system because we have incorporated mutation and defectors may depend on repeated appearance via mutation in order to persist. We note, however, that even in the absence of mutation there are parameter regions in our system where cooperators and defectors coexist in a steady state. In these cases, M can be de"ned for either cooperators or defectors.
cooperators and defectors constantly appear and disappear. We explain the persistence of cooperation by considering the life cycle of a population at a site. The life cycle starts when one cooperator establishes a population; this population grows; defectors invade and take over; and ultimately the population goes extinct. During this life cycle, new populations of cooperators are founded by single cooperators that migrate to empty neighboring sites. The system reaches a steady state where cooperation persists, if the global &&birth'' rate of populations is equal to their &&death'' rate, or equivalently, if on average every population gives rise to one other population during its life cycle. This steady state arises from a repeated turnover of populations*cooperation persists although every single population of cooperators eventually dies out. In Section 4, we demonstrate that these dynamics enable the persistence of cooperation in a large section of the model's parameter space. Furthermore, we demonstrate and explain that lowering the local "tness of cooperators in the d.i. model can enable the persistence of cooperation. Within the region of persistence, lowering the local "tness of cooperators can increase the number of cooperators, the density of sites inhabited by them, and their numbers relative to the defectors.
The dynamic mode we have described may appear in a variety of biological systems. In addition to Maynard-Smith's predator}prey model reviewed in the introduction, we consider one model for the persistence of altruism and one model for the persistence of &&prudent'' predation in a predator}prey system. Epstein (1998) observes oscillatory behavior in a spatial PD model which is analogous to the dynamic mode that we describe. In this model, individuals which are either cooperators or defectors occupy sites on a two-dimensional lattice. Each individual plays the PD game with its neighbors, where the payo!s it accumulates determine its probability to produce an identical o!spring or to die and leave its site empty. In one version, he sets the payo!s for cooperator}cooperator interactions to be positive and the payo!s for defector} defector interaction to be negative. This results in oscillation of the total number of cooperators and defectors over time, where the peaks in defectors appear to closely follow the peaks in cooperators. Epstein also notes that in this dynamical regime, decreasing the payo!s for cooperator}cooperator interactions may improve the cooperators to defectors ratio. This is similar to the mode that we describe, where the localized subpopulations in our model are analogous to the spatially extended neighborhoods in Epstein's model. Gilpin (1975) studies a model for the persistence of altruistic behavior in the context of predator}prey systems. Through computer simulations of structured populations, in which subpopulations of predators and prey inhabit isolated patches, he studies the persistence of predator &&prudence'' restraint to not over-exploit their food supply. In his model, &&sel"sh'' predators in a patch drive the prey to extinction, which in turn drives the predator population in the patch to extinction. Gilpin allows for migration between patches and genetic drift within them. Although he does not "nd parameter values where the &&sel"sh'' and &&prudent'' predators can coexist, we believe that introducing mutations that cause the &&sel"sh'' predators to reappear, or increasing the number and perhaps introducing spatial organization of patches would result in the mode of dynamic coexistence we have described.
Maynard-Smith (1976) considers the implications of migration in a patchy environment on the persistence of altruism. He suggests a criterion based on the average number of new defector populations founded by migration from a patch with defectors before that patch goes extinct, which he denotes as M.A In the following summary of his reasoning, note that in our system, M should be de"ned in terms of cooperator populations rather than defector populations.# THE DYNAMIC PERSISTENCE OF COOPERATION He claims that if M'1, then defectors would take-over the population, while if M(1, then cooperators would prevail and defectors would go extinct. If we de"ne M for cooperators rather than defectors, then M"1 corresponds to our steady state. From Maynard-Smith's formulation, one may assume that the case M"1 is a mathematical artifact requiring exact parameters and therefore it should not be considered seriously. This is not true for our system, however, and it need not be true for other systems. In our system, the value of this variable M, which is de"ned for cooperators rather than defectors, is produced by the dynamics of the system. Within the parameter range where cooperation persists, changes in the underlying parameters a!ect other variables of the system, such as the density of sites that are empty or inhabited by cooperators or the average number of cooperators in the system (see Fig. 9 ), but leave M"1. One mechanism underlying this stability, holds when the parameters of the system are changed such that the extinction of subpopulations becomes faster and the number of migrating cooperators becomes smaller. Under these conditions the density of empty sites may increase thus increasing the chance of a migrating cooperator to colonize an empty site (see Fig. 9 ). A similar process stabilizes the steady state with "xed parameters: when the density of sites occupied by cooperators drops below the steady state level, a migrating cooperator has an increased probability of "nding an empty site. A more precise structural and dynamical stability analysis would consider spatio-temporal patterns such as the correlation between newly inhabited sites with neighboring sites inhabited by defectors. We note, however, that the mode of persistence that we describe seems both structurally and dynamically stable, and that this may result from self-regulating processes of the type discussed above. Maynard-Smith reaches a similar conclusion in the analysis of the predator}prey model described in the introduction to this paper. The extent to which the dynamic mode we have described occurs in biological systems depends on the parameter values in these systems. Yet the fact that this mode is both structurally and dynamically stable and holds for a large range of parameters, makes it likely to occur in natural systems.
We describe how cooperation persists, but not how it originates in the "rst place, or continues to evolve once it is established. Although a proper treatment of these questions requires extensions to our model, we o!er a few comments here. When considering the origin and evolution of cooperative behavior, one should remember that cooperative and defective behaviors are often relative terms. In a homogeneous population, the appearance of an individual behaving more altruistically than its peers may elicit a dynamic where the pre-existing type is rede"ned as a defector. If cooperation is costly, the pre-existing type bene-"ts from interacting with the new type without having to pay the cost, and will have the characteristics of defectors upon the appearance of cooperators.
We suggest two scenarios for the origination of the mode we have described. Consider a system consisting of reproductively isolated subpopulations, where new subpopulations are founded by individuals that leave existing subpopulations. Assume further that individuals with cooperative behavior appear in the system, after which defectors, which may have been the pre-existing type, appear. The type of dynamic we describe requires one additional condition: subpopulations of defectors must not be self-maintaining. This condition seems unreasonable at "rst, if defectors were the pre-existing type and therefore existed independently of cooperators. We suggest two ways to account for this seeming paradox. One is to consider a system with an inhomogeneous environment containing harsh areas where subpopulations of the pre-existing type are not able to survive. Since cooperator subpopulations are more e$cient, they can inhabit some of these niches. Once they do, the preexisting type may invade these areas, by taking advantage of the cooperators, and thus the conditions for the dynamic persistence of cooperation may arise upon invasion by cooperators. Another possibility is a system in which reproductively isolated subpopulations share common resources. Once cooperating subpopulations appear, the conditions for a solitary subpopulation change for the worse, again due to the higher e$ciency of subpopulations consisting of cooperators. Consequently, subpopulations of defectors are not self-maintaining, and the stage is set for a steady state of the type we describe. Now consider the course of evolution after a population reaches a steady state with cooperation. Again we assume that subpopulations share common resources. At some point &&improved'' cooperators appear, and consequently both the old cooperators and defectors assume the role of defectors. The long-term evolution (Eshel et al., 1997 of the system then becomes relevant. Speci"cally, one should consider the conditions for invasion by the new cooperators. On the one hand, &&improved'' cooperators may invade by establishing the conditions, through the shared resources, under which subpopulations of the preceding cooperators cannot maintain themselves. If this is the case, then after the new cooperators take-over, the population reaches a new steady state in which the carrying capacity of the environment has increased, and the "tnesses within subpopulations are renormalized.
Taking a higher cooperator "tness while leaving everything else the same can lead, however, to a breakdown in the persistence of cooperation, as we describe in Section 4. If an improved cooperator is characterized by a large when it appears in a given patch, then a large number of defectors is generated during a life cycle, which annihilates the population in its vicinity (see Fig. 9 ). This leads to the extinction of the &&improved'' cooperators and to the continuing persistence of the pre-existing cooperators. Therefore, invasibility conditions for &&improved'' cooperators in these systems can be subtle and deserve a closer analysis. We conjecture that such factors dictate the rate at which cooperation evolves, and may prevent it from improving signi"cantly in a single transition. If this is true, it will be re#ected in both the invasion criterion, and in the renormalization of "tness after a takeover event. 
Proof. The life cycle begins when the "rst cooperator enters an empty size. Denoting this time as t"0, we have
The population at a site then begins evolving according to eqns (4). These equations can be written as follows, separating zero-and "rstorder terms in and D:
(A.5)
The "rst-order terms in and D a!ect the dynamics in two ways: the "rst is by slightly changing the population sizes due to migration between sites and mutation between types. This changes R to the "rst order in and D. The second is by a!ecting t D , the time when the "rst defector appears in the life cycle. The appearance of the "rst defector has a dramatic e!ect on the life cycle, as it marks the beginning of defector takeover. Consequently, we will ignore the e!ects of mutation and migration at all times other than when the defector population size is 0. This will be done by incorporating a &&source'' to the zeroorder defector dynamics, which is &&on'' as long as n B "0 and &&o! '' otherwise. This source term adds one defector at time t#1 with the same probability with which it would appear as a result of cooperator mutation and defector migration.
The zero order (in and D) dynamics with the source term are then described by
where
Denoting a,( ! ) and b,( ! ) these equations could be written as
Taking a linear combination of eqns (A.9) to eliminate the nonlinear term gives
In order to turn the conditional averages and free variables to averages, we multiply eqn (A.11) by P(n A (t), n B (t)) and sum over all possible values of n A (t) and n B (t), to get
where we used
Summing these equations from t"0 to R, we get
This sum is simply the probability that the "rst defector will appear sometime (ignoring cases in which defectors disappear and then appear again). Reorganizing eqn (A.14) and re-substituting a and b, we get This approximation facilitates studying n.n. correlations but ignores higher-order correlations. The class of probability distributions considered in this approximation contains the probability distributions considered in the "rst-order approximation as special cases, where P(E GH ) depend only on S GH . Higher-order mean-"eld approximations consider larger tuples, thus extending the class of probability distributions further. If the system does not have long-range correlations, then as the tuples in the approximation grow it becomes more accurate and approaches the true solution of the system.
The peripheral sites within the tuple do not a!ect each other, and they all a!ect the center site in the same way. Thus, a state of a tuple can be adequately described by the state of the center site and by how many of the peripheral sites there are in each state. Therefore, a tuple E could be in one of: 3( )"45 states. The dynamics for the probability of each state can be derived by "nding the transition probabilities between states, as was done in eqns (14). A similar derivation has been used for the "rst-order approximation in Section 4.2. As this derivation is not very informative but is, nevertheless, incredibly tedious, we do not present it here. Results from the second-order approximation are presented in Section 4.3.
APPENDIX D Deriving Phase Boundaries From Simulations
In this appendix, we describe how the simulated phase boundaries, from Figs 7 and 8, were derived. As noted in Section 4.1, the simpli"ed d.d. model has three parameters that can be taken to be n A /n B , D/ and S B "Dn B /P B . We ran simulations on a 32;32 lattice, with n A /n B "2 and D/ varying from 1.1 to 5.0 (50 values) and Dn B /P B varying from 0.1 to 6.8 (50 values). The points on this parameter grid in which a non-trivial steady state was established appear in Fig. D1 . For each of the simulations that established a non-trivial steady state p C , p A and p B were measured. The measurement was averaged over a long time compared to the dimension of the lattice and the typical time of a life cycle, to control the stochasticity of the simulation and the "nite dimensions of the lattice. Even though we tried to control the accuracy of the measurements in individual simulations, it is not homogeneous across the parameter space. Generally, it decreases when the parameters are closer to the phase boundaries, as the time required to obtain an accurate measurement diverges at the phase boundary. From the measured p C , p A and p B , we derived R"(n A /n B )(p A /p B ) and M"(Dn B /P B ) (1#R). We then plotted the phase space in Fig. D2 , where every point in the R}M space corresponds to a simulation that attains these values. The fact that no points are found below a certain contour, means that none of the simulations attained a steady state where such R, M values were measured. Thus, within the accuracy of the simulations, a steady state with these R, M values cannot be maintained. Based on this premise, we draw the phase boundaries in Fig. 7 .
The way the phase boundaries were drawn for the d.i. model is essentially similar. The d.i. model has six parameters: , , , , and D. We ran simulations on a 32;32 lattice, with "0.9, "0, "1.6, D"0.01, varying R"((1! )/ ( !1)) (( ! )/( ! )) from 0.4 to 10 (50 values) and (D/ ) (1#1/R) from 2 to 10 (50 values), where R and (D/ ) (1#1/R) replace parameters and . The points on this parameter grid in which a non-trial steady state was established are presented in Fig. D3 .
For each simulation that attained a non-trivial steady state M and R were measured (controlling for stochasticity and "nite lattice size). Each simulation in which a non-trivial steady state was established appears in Fig. D4, according measured R and M. The phase boundary in Fig. 8 , was drawn using Fig. D4 .
The fact that groups of points in both phase spaces appear to be on a straight line has a simple explanation. In the d.i. model, R is a parameter, and was chosen over a grid of values, whereas M is a variable deriving from the dynamics, and can therefore appear anywhere on the "xed R line. The explanation for the d.d. model is similar, DS B "M/(1#1/R) is a parameter, which explains the straight lines, and M and R are mutually dependent dynamical variables.
Noting that the points in Figs D2 and D4 appear to be bounded from above, we performed simulations for the d.i. model with other parameter values, to inquire whether this is in fact the case. As in Fig. D4 "0.9, "0, "1.6, D"0.01 and R varies from 0.4 to 10 (50 values). In one run, we took (D/ )(1#1/R) to vary from 10 to 18 (50 values), and in a second run it varied between 18 and 26 (50 values). These values were chosen in such a way that they should appear above the points in Fig. D2 . The points for the two new simulation series appear in Fig. D5 along with the points from the previous run, and indeed, all points established a non-trivial steady state. There appears to be no sign of an upper phase boundary.
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